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AbstractÑ Effective activity and event monitoring is an 
essential aspect of digital forensic readiness.  Techniques for 
capturing log and other event data are familiar from conventional 
networked hosts and transfer directly to the Cloud context.  In both 
contexts, a major concern is the risk that monitoring systems may 
be targeted and impaired by intruders seeking to conceal their 
illicit presence and activities.  We outline an approach to intrusion 
monitoring that aims (i) to ensure the credibility of log data and 
(ii) provide a means of data sharing that supports log 
reconstruction in the event that one or more logging systems is 
maliciously impaired. 
Keywords-Cloud security; intrusion monitoring; message 
authentication codes; secret sharing. 
I.! INTRODUCTION 
A news report from a recent computer electronics trade 
show featured a light bulb with an in-built spy camera. 
Although the application of this device is the realm of physical 
security rather than the world of computer, Clouds and 
networks, we can derive two general lessons from this 
example technology.  Firstly, the purpose of the device is 
surveillance.  Secondly, the device aims for covert operation.  
These joint concepts of covert surveillance are important in 
the context of security, whether in the home, on a network or 
in the Cloud.  The primary role for this spying light bulb is 
surveillance, i.e., in the event of a security incident, to record 
data that may later have evidential value.  Capturing such data 
in a covert manner aims to reduce the likelihood that the 
recording facility will be detected and thereby, minimise the 
prospect that the data collection will be deliberately impaired 
and the telling data subverted.  
While covert surveillance affords no immediate defence 
against security breaches, it does illustrate the desirability of 
establishing auditable data in order that light may later be shed 
on unauthorised or anomalous events that have initially gone 
undetected by relevant human agency.  With varying degrees 
of transparency, the logging features in computer operating 
systems, individual computer applications, network 
operations and Cloud environments go some way toward 
addressing this requirement by recording data that may 
subsequently be consulted, in a process of digital forensics, as 
evidence of past events.  Thereby, Ôa forensic investigation of 
digital evidence is commonly employed as a post-event 
response to a serious information security incident.Õ É 
ÔForensic readiness is defined as the ability of an organisation 
to maximise its potential to use digital evidence whilst 
minimising the costs of an investigationÕ [1, p.1].   
Although considerable efforts are directed in computer 
security toward protection and prevention of illicit access and 
system misuse, digital forensic readiness is increasingly 
recognised as a necessary measure toward recovery, 
understanding vulnerabilities and pursuit of those responsible 
for cyber-misdeeds (e.g., [2]). 
In the following, Section 2 reviews the characteristics of 
Cloud services and the facilities available to the customer.  
Section 3 characterises the attack context, with reference to 
recognised phases and the likely associated intruder 
behaviour.  In Section 4, we elaborate upon the role of 
monitoring as a basis for forensic readiness in Cloud Services, 
with specific attention to the variety of strategies that may be 
employed, both overt and covert, as well as their likely 
effectiveness as mechanisms for event reconstruction and on-
going resilience.  Section 5 presents an example monitoring 
approach that contains specific aspects toward a solution to 
the forensic readiness problem in the Cloud context.  As 
summarised in Section 6, our proposed approach would 
generate auditable information that can be used subsequently 
for digital forensics analysis in a post-hack scenario, within a 
setting of Cloud Services. 
II.! CLOUD SERVICES 
In this section, we briefly review the characteristics of 
Cloud Services, in order to highlight the security concerns 
associated with different use contexts. 
The US National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), has provided a detailed account of Cloud Services [3].  
This includes a description of typical service models:  
¥! Software as a Service (SaaS);  
¥! Platform as a Service (PaaS); and  
¥! Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS).   
In the first case, the customer is given access to 
applications running on the service providerÕs Cloud 
infrastructure, usually through a variety of client devices and 
software interfaces.  Aside from specific application 
configuration options, in this arrangement the customer is 
given no control over the underlying Cloud infrastructure (op. 
cit., p.2).  This level of service extends from simple file 
storage, through hosted Web sites and database management 
to specific Web services, including RESTful applications [4], 
and use of ÔcontainersÕ [5]. 
In the second case, the customer is permitted to deploy 
their own applications on to the service providerÕs Cloud 
infrastructure.  Customer control extends to configuration and 
management of these Cloud-hosted applications but, as 
before, the customer has no facility to control any other 
aspects of the underlying Cloud infrastructure [3, p.2]. 
In the third case, the customer has greater scope for 
software deployment on to the Cloud infrastructure, extending 
to Ôarbitrary software, which can include operating systems 
and applicationsÕ (op. cit.).  Still, in this arrangement, the 
customerÕs control is limited to the deployed software 
applications, including operating systems (e.g., virtual 
machines) and associated networking features (such as 
software firewalls) [3, p3]. 
These service models characterise typical Cloud Service 
Provider (CSP) offerings and the increasing levels of access 
and software capability, is reflected in increasing levels of cost 
to the consumer.  Notably, in each of these contexts, 
management and control of the Cloud infrastructure resides 
with the CSP, who must be relied upon to manage most 
security aspects that may impinge upon the purchased 
services. 
The range of applications and software facilities afforded 
by Cloud services is extensive, and indications are that many 
mission-critical services are moving to Cloud 
implementations as a means of limiting security concerns and 
assuring greater resilience.  The virtual nature of Cloud 
services also means that system recovery or replacement can 
be quick, reliable and cost-effective [cf. 6].  Such outsourcing 
of local software applications is recognised as commercially 
attractive for factors, such as: 
¥! Cost (reduction in local expertise and local 
infrastructure); 
¥! Reliability (service-level agreements can assure 
availability); 
¥! Resilience (speedy recovery in the event of data or 
service loss); 
¥! Technical extensibility (support for multiple 
instances of applications with increasing availability 
of service to meet growing demand). 
To simplify the categories of Cloud uses, we may broadly 
differentiate two end-user contexts.  In the first, the customer 
employs the Cloud service as a data storage facility. (This is a 
specific instance of the Software as a Service.)  Here, security 
for the customer is limited to concerns of authorised access, 
continuity of service and data maintenance.  In the second 
context, the end-user employs the Cloud service as a means of 
computation.  (This broadly covers all other Cloud 
interaction.)  Here, security for the customer extends to all 
traditional aspects, including data protection, access 
authentication, service misappropriation and service 
availability.  While some of these issues may lie within the 
control of the consumer, the CSP has ultimate management of 
the infrastructure that affords all of the higher-level service 
provision.  The extent to which the CSP can reliably manage 
the security and associated integrity of provided services, 
depends ultimately upon the availability of techniques for 
detecting and recording the details of any illicit operations that 
take place within the Cloud service context.  Without recourse 
to such facilities, the CSP cannot be counted upon to maintain 
consumer services in a satisfactory fashion since there is lack 
of assurance that such services have not been infiltrated, 
impaired or subverted.  In addition, ability for the CSP to 
restore services to pre-compromise level depends largely upon 
the CSPÕs facility to identify any delta between pre- and post-
intrusion services.  Inevitably, this leads back to the issue of 
digital forensic readiness as applied to the Cloud context. 
III.! THE ATTACK CONTEXT 
In general, there are three phases to a successful cyber-
attack: 
1. reconnaissance and information gathering; 
2. infiltration and escalation and, finally; 
3. exfiltration, assault and obfuscation. 
In phase 1, the adversary gathers any information needed 
to gain access to the system, e.g., open ports, versions of 
operating systems and software services, security measures 
(such as firewalls, IDS, etc.) [6].  Using this information, the 
adversary gains access to the system in phase 2 [8].   
The process of gaining access might consist of several 
steps, for example, if the adversary has to comprise another 
system first, in order to get into the actual target.  In this 
process, the adversary also tries to escalate available 
privileges in order to gain super-user access to the system.   
In phase 3, the adversary extracts any information from the 
system that might prove to be useful [9].  If the goal of the 
attack is stealing confidential data, such as user accounts, 
passwords or credit card information, this data is extracted by 
the adversary and possibly sold to third parties.  If the cyber-
attack has another goal, e.g., sabotage, the adversary extracts 
the data needed to launch the actual assault, often triggered by 
a certain date or specific event.  In any case, the adversary can 
be expected to perform whatever action is required to cover 
their tracks.  Among other actions, they may install a rootkit 
that exchanges current files and services within the system 
with modified versions of these particular files and services.  
Such system modifications may extend to altering process 
information, e.g., a program to list all running processes on the 
system may be modified to list all running processes except 
for the processes run by the adversary.  Additionally, the 
adversary may target existing log files that might contain 
traces of the intrusion. 
Such strategies are reflected in many network-based 
intrusions since, in many instances, network vulnerability is 
predicated upon known weaknesses in networked hosts.  
IV.! MONITORING STRATEGIES 
As previously noted, digital forensic readiness requires the 
monitoring and recording of events and activity that may 
impinge upon the integrity of the host system.  Much of this 
capability is provided natively by the local system, using 
standardly available operating system logging, perhaps with 
additional active security monitoring, such as dynamic log 
analysis [10] or key file signature monitoring [11]. 
The situation for Cloud-based services reflects in many 
respects the context of a networked host.  Where a customer 
employs Cloud purely as a storage medium, minimum 
security requirements will seek to ensure authenticated access 
and secure data backup.  In turn, the monitoring requirements 
associated with this service must capture details of user logins 
(including source IP, username and success or failure of login 
attempts).  Additionally, any file operations that change the 
status of data stored under the account of that customer must 
also be recorded.  In the event of unauthorised access (e.g., 
stolen user credentials), such default monitoring may offer 
little protection, aside from identifying the identity of the 
stolen credentials and recourse to subsequent backup data 
recovery.  Such monitoring is essentially Operating System-
based, albeit that in the Cloud setting, this OS may be virtual.   
This context of Cloud usage faces the same challenges in 
monitoring and security that confront any networked host, 
with the added complication that a Cloud-based virtual host 
may face added vulnerability via its hosting virtualiser [12].  
Furthermore, Cloud services are often configured to provide 
new virtual OS instances automatically to satisfy demand, and 
in turn, shut these down when demand falls.  A side-effect of 
such service cycling is that system logs are lost to the 
customer, and subsequent digital forensic analysis may be 
unavailable. 
In the ÔtraditionalÕ network setting, numerous techniques 
have been devised to afford post-event insight on system 
failures and unwelcome exploits.  In all major operating 
system contexts, whether virtualised, Cloud-based or native, 
system logging affords the baseline for generating auditable 
records of system, network and user activity.  Such system 
level monitoring is well understood and in the event of 
intrusion is likely to be a primary target in order to 
compromise the record and eliminate traces of illicit activity.  
For networked hosts and, by extension, as a monitoring 
strategy for local area networks, a wide-variety of Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS) have been developed and deployed 
with a view to rapid determination of malicious activity.  
These techniques may be rule-based [e.g., 13]. In most cases, 
the IDS monitors and cross-correlates system-generated logs 
in order to identify anomalous event sequences.  Many 
approaches to anomaly-based intrusion detection have been 
reported [14]-[19].  Inevitably, such systems may themselves 
become targets in order to inhibit their detection capability and 
maintain a Ôzero-footprintÕ on the part of the intruder [20]. 
In a Cloud context, each node is using its own logging 
daemon or agent to log important events.  But in comparison 
to a single computer, the log information might be essential 
and therefore relevant for the whole cloud infrastructure.  For 
that reason, cloud infrastructures use a centralised log server 
that receives the log information of all attached nodes.  The 
task of this log server is not only the recording of log files of 
all nodes but also to monitor the cloud infrastructure.  In case 
of a cyber-attack, the log server ideally detects the attack 
(maybe assisted by an intrusion detection system) and starts 
countermeasures.  This exposed role of the log server makes 
it a very attractive target for cyber-attacks itself, or, as 
described above, means that an adversary has to deal with the 
log server in phase 2.  Since the hardware of such a log server 
might also break down even without any cyber-attack, in 
practice more than one log server is used at the same time to 
provide redundancy.   
A practical solution might consist of two log servers in 
"active-active-mode" which means that both are operating at 
the same time, but in case of one system failure, the other takes 
over for the whole cloud infrastructure.  The operation of these 
two log servers might be supervised by a third server which in 
case of failure or attack sends an alarm to the administrator.  
Unfortunately, the problem stays more or less the same: this 
third monitoring server is a single point of failure and is 
therefore attractive as a target for any adversary attacking the 
cloud infrastructure.  If an adversary manages to take out the 
monitoring server and to tamper with the log information on 
at least one of the two log servers, the Cloud provider might 
not be capable of determining which log files are correct and 
which are manipulated. 
Any logging service which is introduced in addition to the 
traditional daemons or agents has to meet at least the 
following constraints: 
1. the new logging service must not cause too much 
additional load, either on the nodes (concerning 
computation) or on the network (concerning network 
traffic), and; 
2. the computation of additional security measures in 
order to provide authenticity and integrity must be 
efficiently feasible. 
V.! EXAMPLE MONITORING APPROACH 
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) as described in 
almost any textbook about cryptography can readily be used 
to address this monitoring dilemma.  MACs can be 
constructed using cryptographic hash functions or using block 
ciphers, for instance.  Either construction ensures efficient 
computation of the MACs under a secret key.  MACs are used 
to provide authenticity and integrity; therefore, they meet both 
conditions. 
A solution that we propose starts with a secure boot 
process for each node of the Cloud infrastructure.  During 
boot, the common log daemon or agent is started and it starts 
recording events in various log files.  We suggest to compute 
a MAC for each event and to store these additional bits with 
the plaintext message of the event in the log file.  We assume 
that the plaintext message also contains a time stamp. For the 
next event to be recorded in a log file, the plaintext of the event 
is concatenated with the previous MAC before computing the 
MAC for this event.  This leads to a MAC chain which can be 
checked for each step using the plaintext and MAC of the 
previous event - but only if the secret key is known.  Since the 
adversary does not know the secret key, he is not capable of 
computing valid MACs and therefore not capable of 
tampering with the MAC chain in order to hide his tracks. 
The use of Message Authentication Codes is only the first 
step towards a solution to the problem. An adversary could 
simply delete or deliberately falsify all log files (including the 
MACs). This would probably make it impossible to 
reconstruct the steps of the cyber-attack in a post-hack 
analysis.  
In order to deal with this issue and to make use of the 
benefits of a Cloud infrastructure, we propose the additional 
step of using secret sharing techniques - or so called threshold 
schemes - as published by Adi Shamir in 1979 [21]. 
The idea is to divide some data D into n pieces D#, … , D& 
in such a way that: 
(a) � can be reconstructed easily of any �	 < 	� pieces �,  
(b) the knowledge of only k − 1 or even fewer pieces D0 
leaves the data completely undetermined. 
Shamir named such a scheme a "(k, n) threshold scheme".  
He points out that by using such a (�, �) threshold scheme 




parts �,  to reconstruct � . A lesser number of 
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= � − 1 
parts makes the reconstruction impossible.   
Shamir introduced a (�, �) threshold scheme based upon 
polynomial interpolation. The data � can be interpreted as a 
natural number and p is a prime number with � < �. All of 
the following computations are made in the prime field 
GF(�) . Given �  points in the 2-dimensional plane, 
�#, �# , … , (�= , �=) with distinct coordinates �,, there is one 
and only one polynomial � of degree � − 1 such that � �, =
�, for all � = 1, … , �. At first, the coefficients �#, … , �=Α# are 
chosen at random and �Β = �, which leads to the polynomial 
� � = �Β + �#� + �7�
7 +⋯+ �=Α#�
=Α#. 
The n different pieces of D are computed as D# = q 1 ,
D0 = q i , … , D& = q(n) .  Provided that their identifying 
indices are known, any subset of k elements D0 can be used to 
compute the coefficients a0 of the polynomial q which allow 
the computation of the data D = q(0).  From any subset of 
less or equal k − 1 pieces D0, neither the coefficients a0 nor 
the data D can be calculated. (For further details, we direct the 
reader to the original paper [21].) 
In our proposed solution to the problem of providing 
additional forensic information for post-hack analysis, �  is 
the data to be written in a log file: the plaintext message of the 
event, n randomly chosen nodes of the cloud infrastructure 
and the corresponding MAC, computed from the 
concatenation of the event message, the previous MAC and 
the addresses of these n nodes.  The n pieces D0  that are 
derived from D as stated before, and D is sent to the traditional 
centralised log server.  The n pieces D0 are additionally sent to 
the n nodes which store this information.  For the next event, 
we repeat this procedure but choose n  (possibly) different 
nodes. 
In case of a cyber-attack and if a post-hack analysis is 
necessary, at first all pieces of logging information are 
gathered from all nodes.  Using the time stamps and the MAC 
chains, the order of the logged events can be reconstructed. 
The decentralised stored pieces of logging information are put 
together to reconstruct D  from any k  of the n  parts.  This 
means, even if an adversary succeeds in manipulating some of 
the nodes and the centralised logging system, the events can 
be reconstructed.  Finally, the integrity and authenticity of 
these events can be checked using the MAC chain.   
The proposed approach may identify and retain 
information on an intruderÕs actions that result in stolen, 
modified or deleted data.  This is a feature with growing 
importance, as legislative demands on data protection 
increase. For instance, the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation that is due to come into force in May 2018, will 
require companies to notify all breaches within 72 hours of 
occurrence, with a potential penalty of up to 4% of global 
turnover based on the previous year's accounts. 
Note that this solution is not proposed as a general basis 
for monitoring the Cloud infrastructure.  Rather, its purpose is 
to provide secure logging information for a post-hack analysis 
by distributing their parts randomly over all nodes.  Thereby, 
reliable system monitoring can be established by means of 
multiple log servers, with the added assurance of Message 
Authentication Codes. 
VI.! CONCLUSIONS 
Recognising the importance of securing log data as a basis 
for digital forensic reconstruction in the event of system 
intrusion, a multiple server solution combined with Message 
Authentication Codes affords a mechanism that allows for 
safe deposit and reconstruction of monitor data.  This can 
operate in a Cloud setting in which each logging node is a 
virtual server. 
An important benefit from this distrusted solution is that 
digital forensic reconstructions are possible for virtual 
machines that are ÔcycledÕ, since their native OS logs can be 
maintained in a recoverable and verifiable form beyond the 
OS of those machines.  This provides the safeguard of digital 
forensic readiness for Cloud customers in the event that an 
intruder accesses private data on the Cloud service and causes 
that system to cycle as an attempt to delete all traces of illicit 
data access. 
The possibility, however slight, that an intruder may gain 
access to and potentially compromise all peers in this 
configuration, can be mitigated by also allowing log data to 
transfer ÔupwardsÕ to one or more ÔsuperiorÕ systems (e.g., the 
parent operating systems in which the peer log servers are 
virtualised).  
Evidently, Cloud service provision has a requirement for 
robust monitoring that is sufficient to withstand direct assault 
from an intruder within the host context.  Conventional OS 
monitoring goes some way toward providing the equivalent of 
a light bulb with an in-built spy camera, but needs to be 
enhanced with a reliable mechanism for validating and 
reconstituting log data, such as we have outlined in this paper. 
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